استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة تجاه العراق: من التدخل المباشر إلى الانسحاب

Abstract

Abstract

This study examines the United States strategy in Iraq IN the period 2003-2011. This phase is considered the most crucial in the U.S strategy toward Iraq, as the direction of U.S involvement in Iraq in subsequent years. The article delves deeply into the transition from the invasion and the direct invasion of 2003 to counterinsurgency operation, institution building , and the decisions made at that time, as well as their consequences leading to the U.S withdrawal in 2011. During this period the contradictions and inconsistencies within the U.S strategy became apparent for the first time, influencing subsequent U.S strategic choices regarding Iraq. In this study attempts to answer the fundamental question of the reasons behind the strategic shifts in the U.S between 2003-2011. It examines how U.S objectives shifted from regime change to occupation, then to a focus on stability, and finally to withdrawal the strategy was a hesitant response the the security situation, sectarian conflict, and weak institutions as well as to internal pressures in Iraq that influenced US strategy. Although the study argue that some aspects of the strategy was rational in light of Iraq reality, the overall trajectory of the strategy revealed conflicting objectives and a lack of post war plan. This led to ambiguity in U.S strategy and prolonged state of uncertainty in Iraq. The article discusses the rationality of U.S strategy and decision making regarding intervention and regime change , and the fluctuations in U.S strategy .