Does Reasoning Hurt : The Role of Negative Emotions in Triggering Deliberative Reasoning

Abstract

Abstract

Human cognition is often described as relying on two distinct modes of processing: one fast and intuitive, the other slow and reflective. Reflective thinking typically demands effort and mental resources, whereas intuitive responses come with little cost. A major challenge for theories of reasoning is to clarify what initiates the shift from intuition to reflection. Several accounts have offered plausible mechanisms for this transition, yet they frequently struggle to reconcile existing evidence on the role of emotion in cognition. In this paper, we examine deliberation through the lens of affective experience. Drawing on pragmatist philosophy, we suggest that individuals experience a negatively valenced state, doubt, when confronted with situations that resist immediate or intuitive processing. The intensity of this doubt can vary, and deliberation functions as a means to reduce it. Incorporating this affective dimension into models of reasoning, we argue, provides a better understanding of what prompts reflective thought, why individuals are motivated to engage in it, and why intuition is often favored when possible. The aim of this article is to show that the pragmatist perspective can be grounded in contemporary psychological research by advancing a theoretical framework aligned with current work on reasoning.