Attributional Lag: Structured Choice and the Conditions of Personal Accountability

Abstract

Abstract

ABSTRACT Several influential approaches to responsibility already recognise that agency is causally, socially and institutionally conditioned. This article begins from that shared baseline and identifies a different problem: attributional lag. Institutions may acknowledge the social formation of agency when explaining how choices arise yet continue to treat a prior choice as a sufficient warrant for concentrating durable consequences on the individual. I distinguish token‐action moral responsibility from institutional personal accountability and develop three diagnostic dimensions for evaluating this mismatch: epistemic access, practical accessibility and temporal revisability. Practical accessibility is not a revival of the principle of alternative possibilities; it asks whether alternatives invoked by institutions were realistically available rather than merely formal options. Temporal revisability does not imply costless reversal; it asks whether later learning can be given proportionate weight in institutional decisions. Attributional lag therefore names a mismatch between an institution's explanation of agency and its later use of choice to justify consequences.