Solidarietà ed eguaglianza nel diritto civile moderno: persona, autonomia privata e legalità costituzionale

Abstract

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the constitutional principles of equality and solidarity and the institutions of private law, starting from the central role assigned to the person by Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution. It argues that substantive equality cannot be mechanically transplanted into private relationships as a general redistributive rule. Rather, it operates through the hierarchy of sources, constitution-oriented interpretation, general clauses, protective legislation and judicial review of the exercise of private autonomy. Particular attention is paid to good faith, the protection of weaker parties, the social function of property and economic initiative, and the contribution of European Union law, especially Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The article proposes a model balancing social justice and contractual autonomy, in which solidarity operates as a criterion for controlling private power without eliminating individual freedom. The impact of equality on private relationships is therefore reconstructed according to a variable-intensity approach, depending on the relevant source, the structure of the relationship and the legal technique through which the principle is concretised.