The Transformation of the Concept of ψυχή in the Classical Period of Ancient Philosophy

Abstract

Abstract

The article examines the transformation of the philosophical conception of ψυχή (soul) during the period of classical Greek philosophy within the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. The study is conducted within the frame-work of historical-philosophical research on ancient anthropology. The relevance is determined by the absence (at least in the domestic literature) of the detailed investigation devoted, in one respect, to the transformation of pre-philosophical (in particular, Orphic) and natural-philosophical beliefs of ψυχή into fully-fledged “psycholog-ical models” in Europe for the first time – Plato’s model of ψυχή-soul and Aristotle’s model of ψυχή-form – but then to the interrelation between these models. The work allows to learn in depth and from many sides the philosophical-anthropological projects of these thinkers detemining properly their place in the anthropological tradition that existed in Greece at the time. The aim of the work is to analyze the doctrines of Plato and Aristo-tle’s ψυχή, to construct their “psychological models”, and to define both their conceptual connection and their differences. This determines the following tasks: 1) to trace the formation of Plato’s conceptions of ψυχή in his dialogues (including the early ones), while simultaneously constructing, on the basis of its characteristics of Plato’s “metaphysical model” of ψυχή as an ideal οὐσία-εἶδος represented in the form of a winged chariot; 2) to specify the essential features of Aristotle’s view on the nature, structure, and functions of ψυχή, and to build his “realistic model” of ψυχή as the form that organizes the body; 3) to describe the conceptual differences in Plato and Aristotle’s “psychological models”. The methodological basis is comprised by historical-philosophical and hermeneutic approaches as well as the elements of comparative analysis. In conclusion, it is noted that ψυχή at Plato and Aristotle possess a significantly different ontological status, which predetermines substantial differences in future anthropological systems erected on either of the “psychological models” of these great philosophers.