INSTITUTIONAL FRICTIONS IN WORLD BANK-FINANCED PUBLIC INVESTMENT OPERATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM IPF AND PFORR IMPLEMENTATION IN UZBEKISTAN

Abstract

Abstract

This study examines why governance arrangements do not always translate into timely decisions and development results in the World Bank-financed public investment operations. Using comparative qualitative case analysis, documentary analysis, and process tracing, it investigates two Investment Project Financing operations and one Program-for-Results operation in Uzbekistan; five additional operations provide triangulation. The unit of analysis is the management process rather than the project. Evidence identifies an agreement-to-implementation gap: legal agreements, appraisal documents, operational manuals, and national acts establish legitimate requirements, yet their combination can create duplicated controls, responsibility without decision rights, fragmented data ownership, and delayed escalation. IPF and PforR require different management architectures. IPF depends on integration across scope, procurement, contracts, expenditure, and outputs, whereas PforR depends on a result-delivery chain linking program ownership, administrative data, evidence, and independent verification. The article proposes a differentiated Institutional Risk Governance Framework comprising an alignment gate, decision-rights mapping, a control-value test, interface-risk management, an Individual Comments Map, and a Process and Risk Ledger. The contribution lies not in inventing these generic tools, but in integrating them around documented institutionalization gaps in World Bank operations in Uzbekistan. The framework is a design proposition requiring prospective pilot validation.