Politically Dangerous Minds: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Vygotsky, Luria, and the Socially Mediated Survival of Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract

Scientific theories survive on institutional fitness, not empirical merit alone. Under Soviet Stalinism, Vygotsky and Luria’s cultural-historical psychology was suppressed while Leontiev’s Activity Theory flourished because it aligned with Marxist-Pavlovian materialism. A game-theoretic framework formalizes this dynamic through three coupled mechanisms: a researcher utility function (Ur = αT + βR − γC), a state utility function (Us(e) = δI(e) − εD(e) − κ(e)), and a replicator dynamic for institutional selection. Under sufficiently high punishment coefficients, the unique Nash equilibrium is aligned with the ideologically safe theory regardless of empirical truth, and the replicator dynamics drive empirically stronger theories to extinction in the institutional population. Classical findings on conformity and obedience from Sherif, Asch, Festinger, Schachter, and Milgram supply the foundations for the model’s parameters. This pattern—termed here as epistemological selection pressure—explains the Vygotsky case. Because the model assumes severe punishment, active enforcement, complete information, and a binary choice, it applies most directly to authoritarian science; contemporary liberal institutions correspond to the low-punishment regime in which the same model predicts that empirical merit can prevail, so the mechanism is expected to recur only in attenuated form within specific high-pressure domains where scientific truth and institutional power remain entangled.