Reframing Moral Philosophy through Disabled Ethics: Autonomy, Personhood, and the Politics of Care

Abstract

Abstract

This paper critically explores how disabled ethics reshapes traditional moral philosophy by challenging dominant notions of autonomy, personhood, and justice. Positioned against the ableist foundations of Western moral thought, disabled ethics emphasizes inclusion, interdependence, and the lived experiences of disabled individuals. Tracing its intellectual lineage from classical and religious texts to contemporary disability rights movements, the paper contrasts the medical model of disability with the social and relational models. Drawing on key theorists like Eva Feder Kittay, Lennard Davis, Anita Silvers, and others, it argues for an ethics rooted in care, vulnerability, and mutual dependency rather than abstract rationality or independence. The discussion incorporates intersectional and non-Western perspectives—highlighting the cultural, spiritual, and social meanings attached to disability across African, South Asian, East Asian, and Islamic traditions. The study concludes by examining the policy implications of disabled ethics in healthcare, education, and law, advocating for proactive inclusion and participatory justice. Ultimately, the paper redefines the moral landscape to affirm that justice and dignity must account for the full spectrum of human embodiment and interdependence.