Three Essential Attributes of Collateral Consequences in the United States: The Case of Jury‐Eligibility Restrictions

Abstract

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article identifies three central characteristics of collateral consequences policy in the United States, employing a case study of laws limiting the ability of people with conviction records to serve on juries. Collateral consequences, or collateral sanctions, restrict the rights and privileges of people with criminal histories to engage in political, economic, and social activities, and appear to be more severe in the United States than in other democracies. But in the U.S., such policies generally do not impose clear rules on a discrete class of citizens. Instead, they are textually complex , based on laws featuring variation, ambiguity, and sometimes outright indeterminacy. Profoundly shaped by implementation, particularly interpretive decisions made by state and local officials, such policies are procedurally constituted . These two characteristics bring about a third: collateral sanctions enact multiple forms of exclusion . They generate misinformation that appears to prevent many eligible people from participating; they categorically bar some people with backgrounds; and they exclude others only after individualized discretionary evaluation. Better understanding these three attributes of collateral sanctions will help scholars and policymakers appraise their impact more effectively, deepens normative critiques, and points to avenues for reform.