The Constitutional Model of Regionalism in the Italian Republic: A Mechanism for Conflict Management and the Preservation of Territorial Integrity

Abstract

Abstract

The article examines the constitutional model of territorial organization in the Italian Republic, focusing on regionalism as a constitutional and legal mechanism for the management of ethnic and political conflicts. Employing historical-doctrinal and comparative legal methods, the study analyzes the evolution of Italy's system of territorial governance from a centralized state model to an asymmetric system of regionalism. Particular attention is devoted to the constitutional allocation of legislative and administrative competences among the central, regional, and local levels of government, the constitutional significance of the principle of subsidiarity as a constitutional model for the peaceful accommodation of ethnolinguistic diversity. The findings demonstrate that constitutionally guaranteed regionalism and decentralization have contributed to establishing a sustainable balance between central and regional authorities, strengthening the protection of minority rights, and preserving the territorial integrity of the state. The Italian model represents a hybrid constitutional framework that combines elements of regionalism and federalism, thereby reconciling national unity with territorial diversity. The article argues that regionalism should be understood not merely as a model of territorial organization but also as a preventive constitutional mechanism for resolving territorial and ethnopolitical conflicts. It further suggests that the Italian experience offers valuable constitutional and institutional lessons for states facing challenges related to territorial integrity, political integration, and the accommodation of ethnic diversity, including Georgia.