Diagnosing Electoral System Performance: A Juridical Analysis of Open-List Proportional Representation in Indonesia

Abstract

Abstract

Indonesia has used an open-list proportional representation system since the 2009 election to strengthen voter-representative linkage and internal party democratization. Yet persistent issues such as money politics, vote-buying, intra-party fragmentation, and low accountability of legislators question whether the system effectively converts voter choice into representative governance. This research diagnoses the performance of Indonesia’s open-list PR system through juridical analysis, focusing on its legal framework, implementation challenges, and compatibility with constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and fair representation. This research is normative juridical research using statutory, conceptual and case approach. The main sources are the Constitution 1945, Law No. 7/2017 on Elections and rulings of the Constitutional Court. Secondary Materials include academic literature and election reports 2009-2024. The results indicate that although the system legally broadens the choice of the voter, its effectiveness is compromised by the inadequate party institutionalisation, the loopholes in the regulation of campaign finance and the inconsistent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on election thresholds. It prioritizes individual popularity over party ideology, resulting in weak legislative cohesion. Conclusions that can be drawn are that the open-list system in Indonesia requires substantive reform through stricter campaign finance regulation, stronger internal party mechanisms, and a coherent constitutional interpretation to improve electoral accountability and systemic performance.